In this paper we assess the extent to which exposure to two legal regimes and higher reputational risk limit the ability to extract private benefits of control by trading on insider information. We analyze profitability of insider trading in cross-listed compared to domestically listed companies. We use a unique dataset of all insider trading transactions and corporate news announcements in the UK firms over the period [1999][2000][2001][2002][2003]. In line with previous evidence we find that insiders are contrarians and the announcement date and postannouncement date abnormal returns are positive in the case of insiders buys and negative for the sells. However, we show that most of the event date and post-event date abnormal performance after insider trading happens in domestically-listed companies. To asses whether insiders in cross-listed companies trade less on private information we analyze corporate news announcement released around insiders' trades and we find that insiders in cross-listed companies are less likely to buy before good news announcements and sell before bad news announcements. Our investigation additionally indicates that the binding effect of exposure to two legal regimes and higher reputational risk is more pronounced in the case of the sell. This results suggest that insiders in cross-listed firms may refrain from selling in anticipation of bad news leaving the uninformed investors in long positions in loosing stocks because of potentially more severe sanctions and reputational risk consequences, while, in the case of purchases, the expropriation is less harmful because insiders and outsiders gain from subsequent increases in stock prices. 
Does Cross-Listing Mitigate Insider Trading?
Previous studies report that corporate insiders trade on private information and outsiders can earn abnormal profits by mimicking these trades. 1 The legality of such trading is widely debated in the literature. Some studies argue that insider trading should be allowed as it increases market efficiency because any private information, related to the news released after the trade, becomes compounded quickly into share prices (e.g., Cornell and Sirri, 1992; Manne, 1966; Meulbroek, 1992; Hu and Noe, 1997) . Insider trading can also be beneficial as it allows managers to signal their assessment of the true value of their miss-valued firms and mitigates the motivational problems that interfere with efficient contracting between managers and shareholders (Demsetz, 1986) . In contrast, other studies maintain that insider trading should be regulated because such trades are based on private information, leading to an expropriation of uninformed investors. (See Bainbridge, 2002, and Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002 , for a review). In addition, the restriction of insider trading is likely to mitigate any potential private benefit of both insiders and controlling shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders (Maug, 1999) , lower the perceptions of unfair practices, level the playing field for investors, and, as a result, attracts more capital and lowers the cost of capital (e.g., Kyle, 1985) . Although these arguments provide support for the current insider trading regulations in many countries, this activity is difficult to regulate because of the complications in defining an insider, the information that is 'price-sensitive', separating insider trading on private information from trading for portfolio changes or liquidity, and the controversies as to whether insider trading is profitable after accounting for transaction costs. As a result, while in many countries a set of laws prohibit insider trading based on private information, they are inefficient as only few legal cases emerged from these rules (Bhattacharya and Douk, 2002) .
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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this research by assessing the extent to which insider trading is constrained by the exposure to additional regulations. We test the hypothesis that insiders of cross-listed companies are less likely to trade on private information as they face stricter enforcement regimes because they are subject to two countries' legal requirements. To our knowledge, no previous study has analyzed insider trading in the context of international cross-listing. While recent studies on cross-listing have focused on the governance, and the legal and reputational bonding hypotheses following cross-listing (e.g., Pagano, Roell and Zechner, 2002; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Siegel, 2005) , studies on insider trading are mainly concerned with the effectiveness of domestic legal rules in deterring insiders from trading around particular news releases (e.g., Agrawal and Jaffe, 1995, Seyhun and Bradley, 1997) . Our study expands these trends in the literature by comparing the information content of cross-listed versus domestically-listed companies and test the hypothesis that cross-listing mitigates the propensity of insiders to trade before material news is announced. Compared to domesticallylisted companies, we expect insider trading in cross-listed companies to be executed for portfolio changes, liquidity or mispricing considerations rather than private information, to comply with the additional restrictions in the foreign country. The analysis of news announcements around insider trading allows us also to separate the two main sources of insiders' superior trading performance, namely their ability to recognize their firms' market mispricing and their private superior knowledge about their firms' future cash flow realizations. In particular, if insiders' trades are driven by their firm's mis-valuation, we expect insiders to be contrarians, i.e., to buy (sell) after significant price declines (increases), but their trades should not occur before releases of material information.
We test these hypotheses by comparing the information content of insider trading in UK companies cross-listed in the US (referred thereafter as cross-listed) to that in UK companies without a US listing (domestically-listed companies). We use a sample of 13, 372 insider trading events undertaken in 907 individual companies and 53,515 news announcements made by companies in our sample around insider trading events. We focus on UK cross-listed firms in the US for a number of reasons. 3 First, although the UK and the US markets have relatively similar corporate governance characteristics, 4 the exposure into the two insider trading legal environments is expected to decrease the trading profits of insiders and result in the insider trading activity to be undertaken for other than information purposes.
The analysis of the insider trading legal systems in the US and UK, reported in Appendix A,
shows that the two systems are complementary and increase insiders' legal potential liability.
Second, this exposure also presents an attractive research environment to test the reputational bonding hypothesis (e.g., Siegel, 2005) which implies that managers of UK cross-listed companies will refrain from trading on insider information because they are subject to a higher loss of reputation than UK companies without a US-listing in the event of prosecution.
We refer to these two additional exposures as the 'legal and reputational bonding contracts '. 5 Third, since cross-listing in the US decreases the level of information asymmetry and improves the firm's visibility through greater analyst coverage, increased disclosure requirements, a more thorough investor monitoring, better accuracy and increased media attention (e.g., Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver, 2002; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003, 2004) , the information content of insider trading is likely to be lower in cross-listed compared to domestically-listed companies. Thus, overall, we expect insider trading in cross-listed companies to have lower information content than that in domestically-listed companies.
Consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Seyhun, 1986) , our results indicate that insiders adopt contrarian strategies as they buy (sell) shares in their own companies after significant price decline (run up). These trades are also likely to be informative as they result in significant positive (negative) post-event abnormal returns. However, we report significant differences between cross-listed and domestically-listed firms. The results based on the univariate analysis show that the abnormal stock price behavior around insider trading is confined mainly to domestically-listed firms. The information content of insider trading in cross-listed companies is relatively small. However, when we account for size and other differences between the two sets of firms, we find that the market reacts differently to the trades undertaken by cross-listed and domestically-listed companies but we show that the bonding effects apply mainly in the case of the sell trades as the post-event abnormal returns of the cross-listed firms are higher than those of domestically-listed firms. These findings reflect the asymmetric effect of possible expropriation which is likely to be more severe in the case of sales when insiders cash out in the anticipation of bad news leaving the uninformed investors in long positions in loosing stocks while the expropriation in the case of purchases is less harmful when both insiders and outsiders gain from favorable post-event price changes.
We also analyse the news released before and after insider trading events. In the preevent period, we find that, for both sets of companies, insiders buy (sell) after releasing bad (good) news, suggesting that insiders are not likely to trade because they can assess better the value of their company. In the post-event period, we find that insider trading in cross-listed companies contains less information than that of domestically-listed companies, implying that the insiders in cross-listed companies are bonded from trading on price sensitive information.
Finally, we find that the probability of buying (selling) before good (bad) news announcements is lower in the case of cross-listed companies. Interestingly, we find that insiders in cross-listed companies are reluctant to trade before news on board changes, earnings and management forecasts. Given that insiders know these types of announcements, the results suggest that insiders are likely to select the news they are willing to trade upon.
These findings provide some support for the proposition that cross-listing limits the propensity of insiders to gain personal benefits by trading on private information because of potential exposure and more severe penalties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and the methodology. Section II discusses the results. Section III checks for robustness and the conclusions are in Section IV.
I. Data and Methodology

A. Data
We use a large database of directors' dealings spanning from January 1999 to et al. (2002) and Reese and Weisbach (2002) , the results indicate that the cross-listed companies are larger and have higher growth opportunities than domestically-listed firms. We also consider profitability measured by the ratio of earnings before interests and tax over total assets (ROA) and show that the cross-listed firms have a higher profitability than domestically-listed firms. The Dividend Yield (the ratio of dividends over share price) is relatively the same across the two samples. The size, growth and profitability differences between cross-listed and domestically-listed companies indicate a selection bias problem which we address in our regressions.
The results also show strong differences between the buy and sell trades. While the differences in size are not always statistically significant, the results indicate that the buy trades are undertaken mainly in low market-to-book and high yield companies. These results provide an early indication that insiders are likely to adopt contrarian strategies as they buy (sell) in value (growth) firms and support the findings of Jenter (2005) and misleads other market participants (Kyle, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Laffont and Maskin, 1990) . The number of insider trades reported on the same day (Trades per Day) reveals that insiders in cross-listed firms purchase shares in their company in more transactions than those in domestically-listed firms. Finally, since the market is likely to distinguish between the executors of the trades to assess the quality of the insider information,
we define a dummy, Top Management, equals to one if the trade is executed by one of these executives, i.e., the Chairmen, the CEO, and the CFO, and zero otherwise. We expect these top executives to have a higher access to price sensitive information. We find that the members of the top management execute more buy trades in cross-listed than domesticallylisted firms. For the sell trades, the difference is not statistically significant.
The results also indicate that for the domestically-listed companies the differences between the buy and sell trades are all statistically significant. In particular, there are more buy trades undertaken by the top management and higher buy trades per day than sell trades.
However, in buy trades, the size of the trade is smaller and the percentage change in holding is lower than in the case of the sell trades. For the cross-listed companies, the differences are mainly limited to the medians not the means.
We also consider the distribution of the number of trades split into bull (January 1999 to March 2000) and bear (April 2000 to December 2003) periods, and across industries. 12 We find, but we do not report, that the average number of trades in the bull period is larger than that of the bear period in both cross-listed and domestically-listed companies. These results indicate that insiders are much more likely to trade when the stock market is high. We also find that in both sets of companies, insider trading is more prevalent in the financial and cyclical services. We account for industry and sample period differences in the regressions.
[Insert Table 1 here]
C. Methodology
We use the standard event study methodology based on market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) , with the parameters α and β computed over the estimation window [-360, - 101] days relative to the event day to investigate the stock price reaction to insider trading.
The event period is [-100, +100]. 13 We use the FTSE All share index, which covers some 700 UK listed firms, as the market index because our sample includes small as well as large firms.
The daily stock prices, adjusted for stock splits and dividends, and the market index are obtained from Perfect Information. We define two event dates to analyze insider trading. The first is the day the insider transaction is released to the RNS and the second is the day the insider transaction was actually executed. According to the regulations the difference between these two dates should not exceed six business days. These two dates allow us to overcome any inconsistencies documented in previous studies (e.g., Friederich et al., 2002 , Lasfer, 2004 . We also account for this difference by comparing the abnormal returns of insider trades for which the announcement dates and the transaction dates are the same, and for those where the announcement is released at least one day after the transaction date.
We assess the impact of cross-listing on the profitability of insider trading in a multivariate framework by running a set of regressions of the abnormal returns (CAR) 14 We control for selection bias to assess fully the differences in the information content of insider trading between the two sets of firms because market response to insider trading in cross-listed companies can be influenced by changes in the legal and disclosure environment but the decision to cross-list may be driven by firms' fundamental characteristics, such as size and growth, making the cross-listing dummy variable endogenously determined, resulting in biased OLS estimators. In order to control correctly for the size effect and the sample selection bias driven by firms' characteristics, we first include the log of market value of equity in the regression. We then follow previous studies (e.g. Doidge et al. 2004 ) and account for size effect by using the two stage least squares (2SLS) and two-stage Heckman type procedures (Heckman, 1979) .
The second approach to test the information content of insider trading is more direct and intuitive. We analyze all the news announced around insider trading and assess whether this information is price sensitive and whether it is released before or after the insider trades.
We measure the price sensitivity of the information by computing the abnormal returns cumulated over [0 to +1] days around the news dates for each news announcement using the same methodology we use to compute the abnormal returns of insider trading. 15 Following a standard approach in the literature (Cheng and Lo, 2006) 
Good (bad) news announcement is an announcement that yields positive (negative) CAR Brennan and Cao (1996) , they imply that these investors are likely to be informed.
II. Empirical Results
A. Cross-Listing and the Information Content of Insider Trading -Univariate Analysis
However, it is not clear as to whether insiders buy (sell) shares in their own company because they feel that their firm is under-(over-) valued, or because they have already announced bad (good) news. We address this issue below when we analyze the type and the quality of the news releases in the pre-trade periods.
We test further the information content of these trades by analyzing the returns over the event and post-event period. For cross-listed companies, the event date abnormal returns Table 2 . These results, plotted in Figure 1 , indicate that while insider trades in domestically-listed companies are in line with the trends observed in previous studies, the abnormal returns of cross-listed companies are not consistent with previous evidence and may suggest that they are executed for non-information reasons, and therefore may provide ambiguous signals to the market.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here]
The lack of downward pressure on prices after the sell trades in the post-event period
could also indicate that insiders in cross-listed companies are like money managers who undertake strategic trading to minimize the short-run liquidity and information effects (e.g., Chan and Lakonishok, 1993) . If insiders trade to minimize the short-run liquidity and information effects, they are expected to split their trades into small amounts. Although this strategy may be costly, it is likely to result in a number of small trades that will cause potential statistical limitation of the investigation because the clustering events, particularly if they are of opposite direction, may mitigate the abnormal returns. 17 We test this possibility by excluding all insider trades that occurred within the first one hundred trading days after the preceding trade in the same company. In line with Del Brio, Miguel and Perote (2002), we expect the abnormal returns to be lower after excluding these confounding events, because single trades are likely to be small and less informative. periods are all statistically significant. Therefore, the exclusion of the confounding transactions does not alter significantly our results, but provides some additional support for our main findings that insider trades executed in domestically-listed companies convey more information than those undertaken in cross-listed companies.
Our results may, however, suffer from size effects as cross-listed companies are significantly larger than domestically-listed firms ( Table 1 ). Given that Lakonishok and Lee (2001) report that the most significant abnormal returns are associated with smaller firms our results may reflect size differences of the two groups rather than the cross-listing factor. We use two methodologies to account for the size effect. First, we divide our sample into quartiles according to the size measured by market capitalization. Second, we match observations in cross-listed companies with observations in domestically-listed firms by size in each quartile. Table 3 Interestingly, for the buy trades, the abnormal returns of the largest companies (quartile 4) are small and the difference in returns between the two sets of firms is not statistically significant.
In contrast, the abnormal returns generated after buy trades in cross-listed companies ( [Insert Table 3 here]
B. Cross-Listing and the Information Content of Insider Trading -Multivariate Analysis
In this section, we account for fundamental differences between the two groups, by running a set of regressions where the dependent variable is the post-event abnormal returns. Table 4 provides the OLS results. In addition to cross-listing dummy variable (CL), we include variables to control for size, the insider trading characteristics discussed in Table 1 and dummies for year and industry effects. In Panel A. the dependent variable is CAR +2,+40 .
The results indicate that the cross-listing dummy is positive for both the buy and sell trades, suggesting that the post-event abnormal returns of cross-listed firms increase more after the buy trades but decrease less after the sell trades. Overall, these results are consistent with the findings reported in Table 3 [Insert Table 4 here]
We also use 2SLS and the Heckman procedures to account for other differences between domestic and cross-listed companies. We first estimate the probability of crosslisting by running a logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one for crosslisted and zero for domestically-listed firms. As in Table 1 , we find that cross-listed companies are, on average, larger and have higher growth opportunities than domesticallylisted firms. We use a probability of cross-listing in the US as an instrument in the 2SLS regressions. Table 5 , columns (2) and (4), report the results. Consistent with the findings in Table 4 , the results indicate that for buy trades, the abnormal returns are higher in cross-listed firms. The results also indicate that the CARs are negatively related to size, but increase with the number of shares traded (Shares Traded) and the frequency of the trades within one day.
These results are in line with previous studies as they indicate that large trades convey more information and have greater impact on stock prices (Easley and O'Hara, 1987) and that insiders split their trades into more orders when they posses private information to insure anonymity or to mislead the regulator (e.g., John and Narayanan, 1997).
For the sell trades, we find positive coefficient for cross-listing dummy which indicates that the profitability of insider sells is lower in cross-listed compared to domestically-listed companies and are in line with our earlier evidence. These results suggest that, in contrast to buy trades, managers in cross-listed companies bond themselves from exercising private benefits of control from insider sells. There is weak evidence that size of the trades and the frequency of the sell trades convey any significant information to the market. The findings show also that firm size (Market Cap) is an important determinant of profitability of insider trading. Given that the post-event abnormal returns are expected to be positive (negative) after the buy (sell) trades, the negative coefficient of firm size suggests that the effect is opposite for buys and sells trades and the profitability of insider buys (sells) decreases (increases) with size of the company.
Columns (3) and (5), report the results of the second step Heckman-type regression results including the Mill's ratio, λ to account for the factors that drive cross-listing. The negative and significant λ indicates that the OLS estimates are biased downward and suggest that the Heckman procedure is more efficient. However, the results are relatively similar to the 2SLS. We also find similar results when the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns over the [+2, +100] period around the insider trading event. 18 Overall, the results indicate that the market reacts differently to the trades undertaken by cross-listed and domestically-listed companies but suggest that the bonding effects apply mainly in the case of the sell trades as the post-event abnormal returns of the cross-listed firms are higher than those of the domestically-listed firms. In the case of the buy trades, the effect is reverted as the abnormal returns are significantly higher for cross-listed companies.
We conjecture that such findings my result from the asymmetric effect of possible expropriation which is likely to be more severe in the case of sales when insiders cash out in the anticipation of bad news leaving the uninformed investors in long positions in loosing stocks. On the other hand the expropriation in case of purchases is less harmful when both insiders and outsiders gain from the price increases.
[Insert Table 5 here]
C. Cross-Listing and Insider Trading around News Announcements
We analyze all the news announcements around insider trading to test whether insiders trade on superior information about the value of their company or on private price sensitive information that is released after the trade. 19 The results are reported in Table 6 . Column (1) and (6) indicate the total number of observations for all and for each type of news announcement. Column (2) and (7) show the proportion of cross-listed companies in each news group.
Columns (1) to (5) report the results for the buy trades. The average abnormal returns of all the news types announced before the buy trades are undertaken amount to -0.006 (p= 0.00) for cross-listed companies and -0.009 (p= 0.00) for domestically-listed firms.
Interestingly, Forecasts (trading statements and management forecast) have the largest significant abnormal returns for both types of companies (CL:-0.052; DL:-0.149). While trading on information disclosed to the market before insider trading can be considered as 'legal', we find that insiders also trade when and/or before the news are released. These results apply relatively to both sets of companies, suggesting that over the short-event period
[-1, +1], insiders disclose price sensitive information and still trade in their company's stock.
However, the news following purchases in cross-listed companies is generally immaterial.
Only Forecasts results in significant positive abnormal returns but this can be due to the fact that forecasts belong to a group of unscheduled news. In contrast, domestically-listed firms continue to disclose price sensitive good news that results in positive abnormal returns, with the exception of Forecasts that continue to be negative and significant. Interestingly, insiders in firms listed on the domestic market appear to trade even before the announcement of earnings, despite the UK legislation that states clearly that insiders are not allowed to trade up to two months before such announcements. Column (5) indicates that the news announcements disclosed by domestically-listed firms generate, in general, larger abnormal returns than the cross-listed companies.
The behavior of the abnormal returns of the earnings announcements and forecast is consistent with a number of studies in the accounting literature. For example, Baik and Jiang (2004) report evidence of managers issue pessimistic forecasts so that analysts revise downward their forecast so that they meet or beat the reduced expectations. The results show that, for the domestically-listed firms, the management forecasts are negative in the pre-event period and in the event period but the earnings announcements are positive and significant in the post-event period while the forecast are negative. For the cross-listed companies only the forecasts are positive and significant. The overall results indicate that insiders are likely to buy stock in their own company after announcing bad news. These results are more negative for the domestically-listed companies but they remain statistically significant for both samples and they indicate that insiders do not necessarily buy stocks in their own firms because they feel that they are undervalued. Instead they appear to buy shares to signal their confidence in the future following bad news releases. In general, insiders are likely to time their trades by buying just after a decrease in share prices following an announcement of bad news and then they announce good news that lifts share prices. Table 6 , columns (8) to (10) report the results for the sell trades. In the pre-insider trading period, the news announcements have resulted in an average increase in share price by 0.006 for cross-listed companies and 0.011 for domestically-listed firms. These positive and significant returns are observed for the majority of news types in domestically-listed firms and they are larger than in cross-listed firm. In line with the results for the sell trades reported in Table 2 , these findings suggest that managers sell stock in their companies after announcing good news and their trades do not necessarily signal market undervaluation. The difference in market reaction to news released by cross-listed and domestically-listed firms around and after insiders trading is less pronounced for sells than for purchases. These results suggest that insiders of both cross-listed and domestically-listed companies refrain from trading on insider information, probably to protect themselves from more sever legal consequences associated with sell trades. 20 However, there are some bad and other good news categories, suggesting that insiders do not always sell when they expect bad news, and implying that insiders do not only try to hide their trades by mixing their buy and sell trades as suggested by John and Narayanan, (1997), but they also deliberately disguise their trades by selling before bad as well as good news in order to reap profits at outsiders' expense.
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In sum, although our prior results indicate that the profitability of insiders purchases is higher in cross-listed companies, these findings suggest that the reputational risks and the exposure to the two legal systems are likely to restraint insiders of cross-listed firms from buying shares on the basis of insider information and expropriating uninformed investors,
while this practice appears to be predominant in the domestically-listed companies.
[Insert Table 6 here]
D. Cross-Listing and the Probability of Insider Trading on News Announcements
The evidence reported in Table 6 shows a clear difference in the timing of purchases around news announcements across both groups of firms. It reveals that insider buys are motivated by their superior knowledge on price sensitive information that is released after the trade in domestically-listed rather than cross-listed firms. To test the robustness of our findings we check whether insiders in cross-listed companies are indeed less likely to trade on private material information, i.e., to buy before good and sell before bad news announcements, by running a set of logit regressions where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if there is a buy (sell) trade up to 20 and 40 days before good (bad) news releases.
The results are presented in Table 7 . Panel A. reports news announced in 20 days (one month) insider trading ban period. Column (1) shows that insiders in cross-listed companies are more likely to buy before favorable news releases. However when we consider impact of news announcements on stock prices (|CAR| News×CL) we find that one percentage point increase in cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) generated by the news announcements decreases the probability of buys by insiders in cross-listed companies by 34% in comparison to the probability of insider buys in domestically-listed firms. The marginal effect for the impact of news (|CAR| News×CL) is -0.34 with t-statistics of -3.01. Interestingly, the deeper analysis of types of news announcements reported in column (2) shows that managers in cross-listed companies are reluctant to buy stock on news on board changes, earnings and management forecasts. Given that insiders expect these types of announcements, the results suggest that insiders are likely to select the news they are willing to trade upon.
Column (3) indicates that the probability of sells before bad news announcements is on average 15% lower for cross-listed than domestically-listed firms for each one percentage point increase in CARs generated by the news. Column (4) indicate that insiders in cross-listed companies are mainly constrained from trading before earnings announcements. These findings imply that, given that insiders in cross-listed firms are subject to insider trading rules in the UK and the US, they are more careful in trading on the basis of insider information. This suggests that the bonding contract limits the propensity of these managers to gain private benefits from insider information. Although our initial regression analysis shows some possible expropriation in the case of buy trades these results indicate that the probability that insiders in cross-listed companies execute buy trades using their superior knowledge about their company is lower than that of domestically-listed firms.
The analysis of news announcements implies that, unlike the buy trades, insiders are more likely to sell their holdings for liquidity reasons rather than for their superior knowledge about the value of their firm. Therefore, for sell trades, insiders may refrain from cashing out in anticipation of bad news leaving the uninformed investors in long positions in loosing stocks.
Such findings may result from a potential exposure and significance of possible more severe penalties in cross-listed firms.
III. Robustness
In this section we provide some robustness checks of our results. We compare the announcement and the trading dates, assess whether our results are sensitive to the macroeconomic cycles, and check if our results are affected by the event study methodology we use.
A. Announcement Day vs. Trading Day
In Table 2 the event date is the announcement date, i.e., the date when companies report the insider trading in the Regulatory News Service (RNS) although execution of most trades occurs before the information reaches the market. In order to assess whether such potential delay affects our results, we replicate the results in Table 2 using the trading date as the event date. We find that, on average, the information on insider trading is released on the fourth day after the trade is carried out. The median shows that the announcement follows insider transaction on the next day. The results, not reported for space considerations, are qualitatively similar to the findings in show significant abnormal returns for both buy and sell trades and for both sets of companies, suggesting that the information on insider trading reaches the market on the day of its announcement not on the execution date. These results do not provide support to Muelbroek, (1992) who reports that, in the US, insider trading is detected by the market when it occurs, i.e., before it is announced. This is partly due to the fact that in the UK insider trading is relatively smaller compared to the total volume of shares traded, as reported in Table 1 .
B. The Information Content of Insider Trading in Bull and Bear Periods
In the institutional trading literature, Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) claim that the differential market reaction to buy and sell trades depend on market conditions. They argue that in bullish markets the suppliers of liquidity will not push down prices following a sell order as it is easy to find a buyer, while in bearish markets institutions have to offer discounts to find buyers for their sell orders, resulting in buys (sells) having a bigger and permanent price impact in bullish (bearish) markets. We check for this impact by splitting our sample period into bull (01/1999 to 03/2000) and bear (04/2000 to 12/2003) periods. We use the announcement dates as the event dates to capture this market microstructure effect. 22 The overall results are qualitatively similar to the findings in Table 2 , Panel A.
The comparison between the bull and bear periods reveals interesting results. We find that the behavior of share prices following the buy and sell trades does not depend on the market conditions. The findings do not provide support for Chiyachantana, et al. (2004) who argue that, in bullish markets, the suppliers of liquidity run up prices in the face of a strong buying interest but they do not push down the prices as much when they face a selling interest because they are not so cautious about the sell orders, while in bearish markets the situation is the opposite because many traders are willing to sell at the prevailing prices but fewer traders are willing to buy, suggesting that in bullish (bearish) markets, buys (sells) have a bigger price impact. In contrast, our results show that in both bullish and bearish markets, the postevent abnormal returns in bull market do not increase more than in bearish markets after buy trades. However, for the sell trades, our results suggest that share prices decrease more in the bear market in cross-listed firms.
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C. Other Robustness Checks
We check the statistical robustness of our results by using alternative event study methodologies to compute abnormal stock returns, as the results reported above could be driven by the computation of the market model coefficients, α and β. We use the market adjusted model (α = 0 and β = 1) and the mean adjusted returns model. We find qualitatively similar results. For example, using the mean-adjusted returns model, we find that the abnormal returns for the buy and sell trades in cross-listed companies are not statistically significant in the event period (0.003, p = 0.13 for buy and -0.001, p = -0.87 for sell), but they are negative and significant prior to the buy trades (-0.096, p = 0.00) and positive (0.130, p = 0.00) before the sell trades. In the post-event period, they are insignificant. Similarly, the results for the domestically-listed companies mirror the findings reported in Table 2 , Panel A.
The stock prices decrease before purchases (CAR -100,-2 = -0.120, p = 0.00) and increase around (CAR -1,+1 = 0.013 p = 0.00) and after the trades (CAR +2,+100 = 0.024 p = 0.00). In line with the previous findings, insiders sell after stock price run ups (CAR -100,-2 =0.178 p-value=0.00) and before stock price decrease (CAR +2,+100 =-0.015 p-value=0.04).
Similar qualitative results are obtained when the sample excludes the confounding events and when the event date is the transaction rather than the announcement date. Overall, our results are not dependent on the event study methodology used.
IV. Conclusions
The paper examines the differences in the market reaction to insider trading in domestically and cross-listed companies. We argue that, since insiders in cross-listed companies are subject to the UK and US insider trading rules, they are less likely to trade on private information and expropriate private benefits at the expense of non-informed investors.
We expect insider trading in cross-listed companies to generate lower event and pot-event period abnormal returns and these trades less likely to be executed before price-sensitive information is released.
We use a large dataset that includes 13,372 insider trading events undertaken in 907 individual companies over the period January 1999 to December 2003 and 53,515 news announcements made by companies in our sample around insider trading events. Consistent with previous evidence, we find that insider trading in the UK conveys information to the market as the abnormal returns are positive for buys and negative for sells during the event and in the post-event windows. We also find that insiders buy (sell) after significant share price decline (run-up), suggesting that insiders adopt contrarian strategies and that they are informed investors. We find, however, significant differences between the two sets of firms.
We show that the abnormal stock price behavior around insider trading is confined mainly to domestically-listed firms. The information content of insider trading in cross-listed companies is relatively small. However, when we account for size and other differences between the two sets of firms, we find that the bonding effects apply mainly in the case of the sell trades as the post-event abnormal returns of domestically-listed firms are negative and significant while those of cross-listed firms are relatively random. In the case of the buy trades, the effect is reverted as the abnormal returns are significantly higher for cross-listed companies. These findings result from the asymmetric effect of possible expropriation which more severe in the case of sales as insiders cash out in the anticipation of bad news leaving the uninformed investors in long positions in loosing stocks while the expropriation in the case of purchases is less harmful when both insiders and outsiders gain from favorable post-event price changes.
We also analyze the news released before and after insider trading events. In the preevent period, we find that, for both sets of companies, insiders buy (sell) after releasing bad (good) news, suggesting that insiders are not likely to trade because they can assess better the value of their company. In the post-event period, we find that insider trading in cross-listed companies contains less information than that of domestically-listed companies, suggesting that insiders in cross-listed companies are bonded from trading on price sensitive information.
Finally, we find that the probability of buying (selling) before good (bad) news announcements is lower in the case of cross-listed companies. These results provide some support to the hypothesis that insider trading in cross-listed companies contains less information than that of domestically-listed companies, suggesting that the insiders in crosslisted companies are bonded from trading on price sensitive information.
Overall, while we believe that our paper contributes to the discussion of the bonding hypothesis and the private benefits of insider trading that result in an expropriation of uninformed investors, we also think that this remains a fertile area for further research as some of our results are puzzling. In particular, we were unable, at this stage, to explain why so much news is released just after insider trading takes place. Although, the UK legislation is very strict as it stipulates that insiders must not trade up to 2 months before earnings are announced and up to one month before other news releases, we find substantial news announcements during and before insider trading events. Although some of this information is relatively immaterial, it is hard to imagine that an insider can forecast that the information released after the trade will not result in significant abnormal returns. In this context, our results are consistent with previous evidence that show that insider trading rules are not binding (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) . The fact that trading on news applies also to crosslisted companies suggests that, as in King and Segal (2004) , Siegel (2005) and Licht (2003), the bonding hypothesis is not fully supported. In this paper, we relied on a comparative analysis of insider trading in cross-listed and domestically-listed companies to draw our conclusions that the bonding hypothesis mitigates the propensity of insiders to trade on insider information. Further research will determine whether such results apply also to crosslisting from and in other countries and also whether, relative to companies listed in the US, insiders of cross-listed companies trade differently. In addition, while we consider only insider trading based on the news released by companies themselves, an analysis of trading around news releases by external parties, such as financial analysts forecasts, will isolate the extent to which insiders still trade on insider private information. In this context, Hseih, Ng and Wang (2005) report that insiders are more likely to buy shares in their own company when their company is unfavorable recommended or downgraded by financial analysts. These results are consistent with the overall negative trend in stock prices before insiders buy stock documented in Table 3 . However, it will be of interest to analyze all news releases around insider trading events. Finally, our analysis is based on the behavior of the abnormal returns, partly because of data unavailability. The analysis could be expanded further by considering some market structure factors, such as the bid-ask spread, to assess the adverse selection problem. The extent to which these factors will strengthen or contradict our results is a matter of further research.
Appendix A -The Insider Trading Environment in the UK and in the US
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The US and UK regulations differ in terms of the definition of insiders, the obligation to report their trades, the timing of the disclosure and the level of law enforcement. Table 1 provides a summary of the various insider trading laws in the US and in the UK as specified mainly in the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 in the US, and in the 1985 Companies' Act in the UK. Both these regulations concentrate primarily on unlawful use of non-publicly disclosed price sensitive information as they consider insider trading to occur when a person trades in his or her company's shares using material, current, reliable, not available to the market, and qualified as new, fresh and price-sensitive information according to UK law, or material non-public information according to US law. However, many insider trades are legal, particularly when they are driven by liquidity reasons.
In the case of a possession of material non-public information, the US regulations included in the Securities and Exchange Act 1934, Section 10(b)5 state that insiders must disclose the information before trading or refrain from trading until the news is disseminated (The Disclose or Abstain Rule). In contrast, the UK law imposes trading ban periods on insiders before any price sensitive information is released. For example, insiders are prevented from trading two months before the announcement of the preliminary, interim, or final earnings and within one month before quarterly earnings announcements (Hillier and Marshall, 1998) . Outside this ban period, insiders need permission from the chairman of the board before trading. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) argue that US regulations favor more frequent news disclosure to avoid misuse of any significant information, whereas UK law prohibits directly insiders from trading before price sensitive news announcement.
Under the 1985 Companies' Act and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Listing
Rules, companies listed on the LSE are required to report any directors' trades in their own firms' securities. In the UK, directors are defined as executive and non-executive members of the board of directors. Corporate insider definition is narrower in the UK than in US where corporate insider includes officers, directors, other key employees, and shareholders of at lest 10% of any equity class. UK disclosure requirements specify that directors must inform their companies without delay about any transaction carried out personally, no later than the fifth business day after the trading date and the company must inform the stock exchange by the end of the following business day and also enter this transaction in the Company Register.
The information on insider trading is disseminated immediately to the stock exchange via the online Regulatory News Service (RNS). 25 In the US insiders must report any trades in their The analysis of the evolution of insider trading law provides evidence that US law on the books considers larger variety of unlawful cases and is more developed than in the UK (Bainbridge, 2002; . However, the UK regulation is more stringent in terms of the (2005) ranks US higher than the UK suggesting that the US has the most restrictive legal regime for insider trading. 27 Although the issue of the quality of insider trading regulations remains unresolved, previous studies provide arguments that the enforcement of the regulations is of primary importance (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bris, 2005) . Beny (2005) reports a higher enforcement level in the US than in the UK using the Indices of Public and Private Enforcement Power. 28 Overall, these arguments suggest that the two legal systems are complementary and they are expected to mitigate the propensity of insiders in cross-listed companies to trade on private information. Insider Trading occurs when an insider trades or tries to trade in his or her company's shares based on undisclosed price sensitive information, or improper disclosure to another person, or misuse of information. Director Deal (commonly called insider trading) occurs when a director trades on equities in his or her company and reports this fact according to the listing rules of the LSE. They are prohibited by law from trading on price sensitive information. There are trading ban periods in the UK before releasing price sensitive information, with a special focus placed on earnings announcements.
Insider Trading occurs when an insider trades in his or her company's shares based on private i.e. 'material' and 'nonpublic' information. Insiders cannot trade on any private information unless it is made public, in such a way that other investors have access to it.
Insider Definition
A person possessing inside information about the issuer: members of the board of directors, both executive and non-executive directors; members of administrative, management or supervisory body; outsiders having an access to price sensitive information through their employment, profession or duties; other individuals who are in non-business relationship with an insider and thus posses insider information (e.g. spouse, child).
A person possessing inside information about the issuer: 'officers, directors, other key employees and shareholders holding more than 10% of any equity class' 'Officer: company president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, any vice president in charge of any principal business unit, division, or function (such as sales, administration, finance) and any other person that performs policy-making function within the company' Constructive Insiders: outsiders working for the company and having an access to 'material' and 'non-public' information as described in the Rule 14e-3 (e.g. un underwriter, accountant, lawyer, and consultant). Family members or other individuals who are in nonbusiness relationship with an insider and thus posses insider information (e.g. spouse, child)
Inside Information 'material, current, reliable, not available to the market, and qualified as new and fresh' (The Misuse of Information Act).
'material' and 'non-public' of two principal forms: Inside information -affects company's assets and earnings and comes from internal corporate sources. Market Information -affects stock prices or market for the company's securities and comes from outside corporate sources.
Who is obliged to report trades?
Members of the board of directors, both executive and non-executive directors Officers, directors, other key employees and shareholders holding more than 10% of any equity class
Core of Regulations
Trading Ban Period -Insiders are prohibited from trading before release of price sensitive information about earnings announcements to the market. The trading ban pertain insider trading within two months before preliminary, interim, or final earnings announcements and within one month before quarterly earnings announcements. Permission for trading from the chairman of the board -When not during the ban period, director needs permission for trading from the chairman of the board.
The Disclose or Abstain Rule -Insiders both 'true' and 'constructive', who posses material, non public inside information must disclose the information before trading or refine from trading until the news is disseminated. Misappropriation Theory considers a situations when 'person trading on private information violates a fiduciary duty owed to the source of information' but not necessarily to 'investors with whom he trades'. Rule 14e-3 applies to tender offers and states that insiders of both bidder and target are prohibited from releasing any 'material' 'non-public' information about the tender offer to any third parties who are likely to trade on it.
Disclosure Requirements Directors must inform their company without delay about any transaction carried out personally, no later than on the fifth business day after the trading date. Subsequently the company must inform the stock exchange by the end of the following business day and also enter this transaction in the Company Register
Insiders must report trades in their companies' shares within first ten days of the month following the transaction. Insiders are required to file SEC form 3, 4, and 5 when they trade in their companies stock. Each insider must sign the form themselves, no matter who does the actual filing. 
Civil and criminal law procedures
Penalties and Sanctions Up to seven years in jail and unlimited fine. Up to $ one million fine and up to 10 years in jail as well as a civil fine up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided. If insider trading involves trading on 'short swings' he or she must return to the company profits earned. This table presents the descriptive statistics of companies in our sample. Cross-listed companies are UK companies listed in the US. Domestically-listed companies are UK companies listed only in the UK. Panel A presents firms' fundamental characteristics. Market Cap is the year-end market value of equity, Dividend Yield is the ratio of dividends over share price, M/B is a ratio of market value to book value of equity, and ROA is the ratio of earnings before interests and tax over total assets. Panel B provides information on insider trades characteristics. %Holding is an insider's ownership in his or her company after the trade. Shares Traded is a ratio of a number of shares traded by an insider to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the year. The table presents cumulative average abnormal returns around insider trading events computed using event study methodology. The market model coefficients α and β are estimated over days -360 to -101 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full sample includes all insider trading observations. All results are reported relative to insider trading announcement day, i.e., the date of the public announcement of insider trading. In Panel B, we exclude all trades that occur over the [-100, +100] (Earnings, Forecasts, Capital Structure, Restructuring, Ownership, General Business, Miscellaneous, Other) that is released up to 40 trading days after insider trade. *** , ** , * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. Panel B. present analogous analysis to explain the probability that insiders buy (sell) stock up to 40 trading days before good (bad) news announcements.
Effectiveness and Enforcement
FSA Annual Reports
Good News
Bad News , 1999) . Other studies document the abnormal returns of insider trading and of the portfolios strategies that mimic insiders (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976a Finnerty, , 1976b Seyhun, 1986 Seyhun, , 1988a Seyhun, , 1988b Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; and Lin and Howe, 1990) .
Similar results are reported in the UK (e.g., Pope, Morris and Peel, 1990; Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, 2002; Hillier and Marshal, 2002) . Lakonishok and Lee (2001) report that the long-term post-event abnormal returns are positive for buy and negative for sell trades.
However, there is debate as to whether these abnormal returns are high enough to allow outsiders to obtain exceptional returns because of transactions costs (e.g., Friederich et al., 2002; Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey, 1997) , or the strategic trading behavior of insiders who deliberately disguise their trades to reap gains at outsiders' expense (John and Narayanan, 1997). 2 For example, although in the UK the 1985 Companies' Act prohibits insiders from trading for a period of up to two months prior to the announcement of earnings and up to one months prior to other price-sensitive information, there are difficulties in defining what price-sensitive information consists of (in addition to earnings, dividends, restructuring, board changes and security issues), and what is the theoretical movement in share price that makes a piece of information price-sensitive (e.g., Friederich et al., 2002) . 3 UK has the largest number of cross-listed companies (171), after Canada (266) and Japan (206), primarily in the US (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004) . 4 These characteristics include the effectiveness of outside shareholder protection rights, dispersion of ownership, and common law origins that prevent insiders from trading on private information. 5 Since UK and US are relatively similar in their governance system, we do not proclaim to test directly the bonding hypothesis as developed by Cofee (1999 Cofee ( , 2002 and Stulz (1999) , which states that managers bond themselves from extracting private benefits of control and expropriating minority shareholder by cross-listing their companies in the US where legal regulations are stricter, law enforcement more efficient and minority shareholder rights are 26 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended the regulations governing the reporting of insider transactions by shortening the reporting period, requiring insiders to report transactions within 2 business days, and requiring that all reports be filed electronically. 27 The IT Index takes into account the tipping of outsiders by insiders about private, price sensitive information, insider trading on private, price sensitive information, and level of potential material and criminal penalties and sanctions. 28 Beny (2005) 
